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IMPLICIT BIAS AND THE PUSHBACK FROM THE LEFT 
JERRY KANG* 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the past three decades, the mind sciences have provided remarkable 
insights about how our brains process social categories.  For example, 
scientists have discovered that implicit biases—in the form of stereotypes and 
attitudes that we are unaware of, do not consciously intend, and might reject 
upon conscious self-reflection—exist and have wide-ranging behavioral 
consequences.1  Such findings destabilize our self-serving self-conceptions as 
bias-free.  Not surprisingly, there has been backlash from the political Right.  
This Article examines some aspects of the more surprising pushback from the 
Left. 
Part I briefly explains how new findings in the mind sciences, especially 
Implicit Social Cognition, are incorporated into the law, legal scholarship, and 
legal institutions, under the banner of “behavioral realism.”  Part II describes 
the pushback from the Left.  Part III responds by suggesting that our deepest 
understanding of social hierarchy and discrimination requires analysis at 
multiple layers of knowledge.  Instead of trading off knowledge, for example, 
at the cognitive layer for the sociological layer (or vice versa), we should seek 
understanding at each layer, and then interpenetrate the entire stack.2 
I.  BEHAVIORAL REALISM ABOUT THE MIND SCIENCES 
“Behavioral realism” is a nascent school of legal thought advanced by 
legal scholars and psychologists.  Broadly speaking, it seeks to naturalize the 
law by making the law more continuous with modern understandings of human 
 
* Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. <kang@law.ucla.edu> <http://jerrykang.net>. 
 1. A substantial body of scientific literature documents implicit bias.  For a review, see 
Kristin A. Lane, Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 3 ANN. 
REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 427, 433–35 (2007). 
 2. This approach is consistent with the one recommended by Steven Pinker.  See STEVEN 
PINKER, THE BLANK SLATE: THE MODERN DENIAL OF HUMAN NATURE 70 (2002) (calling for a 
“hierarchical reductionism” which is not about replacing one field of knowledge but about 
connecting and unifying different levels of analysis). 
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decision-making and behavior.3  More specifically, behavioral realism is 
driven by new findings in the mind sciences.  When some new scientific 
consensus emerges, behavioral realists compare that new understanding to the 
folk psychology embedded in the law.4  When the gap between the two is 
sufficiently large, behavioral realists ask the law to take account, by either 
changing or providing some transparent explanation why it cannot.5 
To take a concrete example, consider what Professor john powell identified 
in this year’s Childress Lecture as the modern rewriting of more classical 
assumptions about discrimination.  In what he calls the Enlightenment 
understanding, individuals were presumed to be fully transparent to 
themselves.6  Given this view, any behavior (e.g., “I’m passing over this 
resumé”) that turned on some individual’s social category (“The name on this 
resumé is Lakisha, not Emily, so I infer that the applicant is Black”) would be 
known to the individual as such. 
But the modern evidence of implicit social cognitions undermines these 
classical assumptions.  We may, in fact, be passing on that resumé because of 
race but without explicit knowledge or purpose.7  Deciding precisely what to 
do about such discoveries in the form of preventative policy, doctrinal 
interpretation, or statutory reform is, of course, bedeviling.  But for a 
behavioral realist, sticking our heads in the sand about the new science is not 
an option. 
II.  BACKLASH 
A. Backlash from the Right 
Recent scientific discoveries have deeply upset the Right.8  Here’s why: 
the Right’s Fundamental Belief is that we already live and compete in a 
meritocratic, color-blind, gender-blind, social category-blind, market-based 
tournament.  In this tournament, there will always be winners and losers—
 
 3. Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment 
Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CAL. L. REV. 997, 1000–01 
(2006). 
 4. See Lane, Kang & Banaji, supra note 1, at 440. 
 5. See id. 
 6. john a. powell & Stephen M. Menendian, Remaking Law: Moving Beyond an 
Enlightenment Jurisprudence, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.  1035, 1039–46 (2010). 
 7. See Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable 
Than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 AM. ECON. 
REV. 991, 1006 (2004); Dan-Olof Rooth, Implicit Discrimination in Hiring: Real World 
Evidence, 2007 INST. FOR STUDY LAB. 1, 1 (2007). 
 8. See, e.g., Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of 
Mindreading, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1023, 1026 (2006); Amy Wax & Philip E. Tetlock, We Are All 
Racists at Heart, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 2005, at A16. 
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that’s precisely the point of the competition.  Losers will cry foul, but they are 
viewed as simply whining about the bad results of a fair game.  Under the 
Right’s Fundamental Belief, everyone already enjoys equality of opportunity, 
and the losers are only complaining about losing.9 
Two lines of research have been gnawing away at the Fundamental Belief.  
Auditing studies performed by behavioral economists have demonstrated that 
identical candidates receive disparate treatment as a function of merit-
irrelevant social categories.  These findings have been made in various 
domains, such as call-back interviews,10 apartment rentals,11 and even writing 
submissions.12  The second line of research comes from Implicit Social 
Cognition, described above,13 which provides causal cognitive mechanisms for 
such disparate treatment.  Through hundreds of experiments in laboratories, 
scientists have measured something called implicit bias and demonstrated that 
it predicts behavior, at least on the margins.14  Coupled together, the audit 
studies and Implicit Social Cognition findings threaten the Right’s 
Fundamental Belief.  Worse, they do so using precisely those rigorous and 
quantitative techniques that the Right demanded when dismissing victim 
accounts about discrimination as mere anecdote. 
B. Pushback from the Left 
The backlash from the Right is predictable because the science provides 
greater evidence that we live in an unjust world, in greater need of reform.15  
 
 9. Of course, this is meant to be a stylized exposition of the Fundamental Belief.  I take it 
that almost no one believes this absolutely and would qualify the tenet at least partially. 
 10. See Marc Bendick, Jr. & Ana P. Nunes, Discrimination in the American Workplace: 
Findings and Research Opportunities Using Paired-Comparison Testing, ___ J. SOC. ISSUES 
(forthcoming 2010) (observing that employment auditing studies have revealed discriminatory 
behavior by “20% to 40% of employers”). 
 11. See, e.g., Stephen L. Ross & Margery A. Turner, Housing Discrimination in 
Metropolitan America: Explaining Changes Between 1989 and 2000, 52 SOC. PROBS. 152, 165–
69 (2005) (reporting audit results that showed net discrimination against African Americans and 
Hispanics in the rental markets). 
 12. Emily G. Sands, Opening the Curtain on Playwright Gender: An Integrated Economic 
Analysis of Discrimination in American Theater 1 (Apr. 15, 2009) (unpublished undergraduate 
thesis, Princeton University) (on file with Department of Economics, Princeton University). 
 13. See Lane, Kang & Banaji, supra note 1, at 429. 
 14. For a readable summary of the research demonstrating predictive validity, see Jost et al., 
The Existence of Implicit Bias is Beyond Reasonable Doubt: A Refutation of Ideological and 
Methodological Objections and Executive Summary of Ten Studies that No Manager Should 
Ignore, 29 RES. IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 39 (2009).  For a meta-analysis of 122 research 
reports, see Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Understanding and Using the Implicit Association Test: 
III. Meta-analysis of Predictive Validity, 97 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 17 (2009). 
 15. For further discussion of the Right’s reaction, and its invocation of a “junk science” 
rhetoric, see Jerry Kang & Kristin A. Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the 
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But there has also been pushback from the Left.  It would be an exaggeration 
to call it “backlash” because the scientific findings generally support a 
progressive agenda.16  But deep concerns lurk about deploying science and 
committing to behavioral realism.  The anxiety is connected to the distrust of 
what john powell calls the Enlightenment model.  The pushback comprises two 
key elements: a rejection of scientific exceptionalism, and an accusation of 
reductionism. 
Rejection of Scientific Exceptionalism.  Behavioral realism obviously 
banks a great deal on the special role of science.  It supposes that “the causal 
processes of the real world exist and operate independent of what we know or 
think about them, and that the scientific method provides one of the best ways 
of understanding those causal processes.”17  Some on the Left, including 
philosophers of science, sociologists of scientific knowledge production, and 
cultural studies commentators might question this reliance on science as naive 
or unsophisticated.  Indeed, they may be suspicious about the call for 
“evidence” and “data” and quantitative techniques, which they view as 
objective-sounding covers for ideology or politics. 
Accusation of Reductionism.  Even if a critic accepts the value of science 
(either for its empirical success or ability to discover reality), she might still be 
uncomfortable with bodies of science that situate “racism” and “sexism” and 
other –isms inside individual brains.  Picking this unit of analysis is seen as 
reductionist because it fails to capture the bigger picture, in the forms of 
“institutional,” “structural,” or “societal” racism.  By contrast, other 
methodological approaches with a larger unit of analysis such as the “group” 
or “culture,” are touted as better-suited to illuminate the problems of social 
justice, with attention to history and power. 
These critiques sounding in scientific exceptionalism and reductionism are 
sincere and important but mostly miss the mark.  To explore how and why, I 
start with a concrete example. 
 
Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1633071. 
 16. Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of 
“Affirmative Action,” 94 CAL. L. REV. 1063, 1117 (2006) (“Unwarranted discrimination exists 
here and now: it can be documented through scientific methods . . . .”). 
 17. See id. at 1065. 
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III.  TOWARDS INTERPENETRATING INSIGHTS 
A. Racial Mechanics Model: An Example 
It is a staple of Critical Race Theory to say that “race is a social 
construction.”18  In other words, race is not self-evident biology or taxonomy.  
But this important general insight is somewhat vague in the particulars and 
invites conflicting interpretations and applications.  For instance, what is not a 
social construction?19  Even a hammer is produced by society, through 
technology and market mechanisms that can be analytically unpacked and 
unmasked.  Also, is there nothing “biological” about race?  After all, isn’t a 
person’s racial category inherited from her parents? 
To help grapple with such complexities, I have proposed a model of “racial 
mechanics” that provides a simple, social cognitive articulation to the mantra 
that “race is a social construction.”20  That simple model focuses on a bilateral 
interaction between a “perceiver” and “target.”21  Upon encountering a target 
individual, the perceiver classifies that individual into a (1) racial category 
according to relevant (2) mapping rules provided to us by culture and any 
specific rules relevant to the context.22  Once that mapping is performed—
typically instantaneously—a set of (3) racial meanings is activated that alters 












 18. See, e.g., Cheryl I. Harris, Equal Treatment and the Reproduction of Inequality, 69 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1753, 1762–63 (2001); Ian F. Haney López, The Social Construction of Race: 
Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 27 
(1994).  Much of this draws from the sociological work of Michael Omi & Howard Winant.  See 
generally MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990S (2d ed. 1994). 
 19. For a relevant description of such social constructions, see generally IAN HACKING, THE 
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF WHAT? (1999). 
 20. See Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1497–1502 (2005). 
 21. Id. at 1499. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. See id. at 1500. 
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To say that race is a social construction is to say that all three core 
elements: the racial categories, the racial mapping rules, and the racial 
meanings are all constructed by social and historical practices, and not 
predetermined by some deity or genetics.  First, the racial categories change 
over time and as a function of politics—just consider how the Census has 
counted “race” differently over the centuries.25  Second, the mapping rules are 
also dynamic—consider how and why, in 1854, the California Supreme Court 
classified the Chinese as racially Indian or Black in order to prevent them from 
testifying in court.26  Third, consider how the racial meanings associated with a 
particular category can rapidly change—e.g., for Asian Americans, debased 
laborers working on the railroads (mid 1800s) to yellow peril (1940s) to model 
minority (late 1960s).27 
My model is social cognitive in that it emphasizes the basic and 
fundamental cognitive act of categorization of human beings into social 
groups.  It is an implicit social cognitive model because it emphasizes the 
automaticity, lack of self-awareness, and situated nature of the racial 
mechanics.  Finally, it is proffered as a useful articulation of the axiom that 
“race is a social construction” because it isolates three distinct ways in which 
we might mean the point: that the categories themselves are constructed; that 
we map individuals and entire groups of people into the categories that we 
have constructed; and that we attach certain meanings (stereotypes and 
attitudes) to the categories that we have constructed. 
B. Comfort on Scientific Exceptionalism 
The basic idea that our brains function by classifying objects into 
categories is not very controversial, neither to the Right nor the Left.  What is 
more controversial is that we might do the same to human beings (not just 
objects), by grouping them into social categories.  Still more controversial is 
that this categorization might function automatically and implicitly to influence 
our behavior.28 
 
 25. For example, in 1977, the federal government shifted from four major racial categories 
(American Indian or Alaskan Native; Asian or Pacific Islander; Black; and White) to five 
(American Indian or Alaska Native; Asian; Black or African American; Native Hawaiian or Other 
Pacific Islander; and White).  See U.S. Census Bureau, Racial and Ethnic Classifications Used in 
Census 2000 and Beyond, http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/race/racefact 
cb.html.  Notice that Pacific Islanders were split out of the Asian or Pacific Islander into its own 
separate category with Native Hawaiians. 
 26. People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 399, 399 (1854). 
 27. See, e.g., Keith Aoki, “Foreign-Ness” & Asian American Identities: Yellowface, World 
War II Propaganda, and Bifurcated Racial Stereotypes, 4 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 1, 18–44 (1996). 
 28. See, e.g., Mitchell & Tetlcok, supra note 8, at 1107–15. 
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It is this last, most controversial point that is being “proved up” by the 
science, to the consternation of those who believe that colorblindness already 
reigns.  When someone suggests casually, without scientific evidence, that 
unconscious racism infects everything that we do, many people’s reactions are 
deeply skeptical.  They retort, “What do you mean by ‘racism’?  What does it 
mean to ‘infect’?  How much, and under what circumstances?  Why is it that I 
can’t observe it in myself, even though I can observe other aspects of my mind 
and body?  Aren’t you just complaining because you lack merit?” 
In response, one could use language and arguments derived from 
nonscientific domains, such as literature, Freudian psychoanalysis, or religious 
faith.  But as a descriptive matter, such arguments will not be very persuasive 
to the skeptic in modern America.  By contrast, language and arguments based 
on “science,” as regularly practiced by 21st century scientists tenured at 
research universities, pack a more persuasive punch.29  Again, I am merely 
describing the brute fact that scientific evidence culled through standard 
hypothesis-testing procedures deploying modern statistics and published in 
peer-reviewed journals is considered to be the “gold” standard for 
policymaking, including legal reform.  Accordingly, if the Left wants to be 
pragmatic about its agenda, it seems sensible to pay attention to what science 
says.  This is not to recommend putting all eggs in the scientific basket, but it 
is an argument not to abandon it altogether. 
In emphasizing pragmatics, I am not staking out a purely instrumentalist 
position that would, for instance, forsake science the moment it became 
politically convenient to do so.  Instead, to repeat, behavioral realism relies on 
the notion that “the causal processes of the real world exist and operate 
independent of what we know or think about them.”30  This notion underscores 
a sort of metaphysical modesty that recognizes that when the tree falls in the 
forest, it makes sound even if there are no human beings around to hear it.  In 
other words, there is a reality “out there” regardless of whether sentient beings 
are around to perceive it.  Those who reject this position will obviously be irate 
at any form of scientific exceptionalism, however mild. 
But this metaphysical modesty may mask an epistemic 
presumptuousness,31 about science somehow being able to discover “reality” 
or “truth.”  After all, what does it mean to claim “that the scientific method 
provides one of the best ways of understanding those causal processes”?32  
 
 29. See Kang, supra note 20, at 1496–97. 
 30. See Kang & Banaji, supra note 16, at 1065. 
 31. I borrow the “metaphysical modesty” and “epistemic presumptuousness” turns-of-phrase 
from the very accessible lectures by Professor Jeffrey L. Kasser.  See Jeffrey L. Kasser, Popper 
and the Problem of Demarcation, in PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 2006, at 6, 6 (The Teaching 
Company Course No. 4100, 2006). 
 32. See id. (emphasis added). 
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This question raises the difficult realism versus antirealism debate within the 
philosophy of science literature, upon which I remain largely agnostic.  I am 
most interested in science’s ability to achieve what Miriam Solomon calls 
“empirical success.”33  In other words, behavioral realists believe that science 
is “one of the best ways of understanding [causal] processes” in the sense that 
it increases the likelihood of empirical success, in terms of prediction, 
explanation, technological manipulation, and prevention.  Whether such 
empirical success is caused by some correspondence to “reality” or “truth” is 
hard to prove (and one that practicing scientists rarely consider).  Some such 
correspondence is my intuition; however, I am happy to concede it as a hunch.  
Perhaps this agnostic stance on the realism versus anti-realism debate will 
decrease anxiety, at least for some, about scientific exceptionalism. 
Finally, although it goes without saying, I should underscore that 
behavioral realism rejects the naturalistic fallacy.  That which “is” says very 
little about that which “ought” to be.  For example, the fact that stereotyping is 
easy and natural says nothing about its normative attractiveness in various 
domains of social life and law. 
To summarize, behavioral realists are scientists, lawyers, and legal 
scholars asking the law to account for new discoveries about how human 
beings think and behave.  Their stance towards science reflects metaphysical 
modesty and pragmatism: because science has produced substantial empirical 
success, it has been granted greater deference than other forms of knowledge in 
policymaking contexts, and reformists should recognize this fact.  Finally, in 
the context of discrimination, evidence-based accounts of disparate treatment 
are compelling even to those who are skeptical about first-hand narrative 
accounts of victimization, which tend to be dismissed as subjective and self-
serving.34 
C. Comfort on Reductionism 
The other foundation of Left pushback is reductionism.35  The complaint is 
that any cognitive approach locates “racism” in the heads of specific 
perpetrators.  This perpetrator model, it is said, analyzes racism as the 
misfiring of neurons in a few pathological individuals, which badly 
 
 33. See, e.g., MIRIAM SOLOMON, SOCIAL EMPIRICISM 16–17, 27–29 (2001). 
 34. Again, I do not want to seem too naïve.  Even findings supported by a substantial body 
of experimental science can still be dismissed as “junk science” that is ideologically motivated.  
See, e.g., Mitchell & Tetlock, supra note 8, at 1067–72. 
 35.   See generally Ingo Brigandt & Alan Love, Reductionism in Biology, STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (May 27, 2008), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reduction-
biology/ (“The basic question of reduction is whether the properties, concepts, explanations, or 
methods from one scientific domain (typically at higher levels of organization) can be deduced 
from or explained by the properties, concepts, explanations, or methods from another domain of 
science (typically one about lower levels of organization).”). 
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mischaracterizes what is really going on.  Instead, if we picked a larger unit of 
analysis, we would be better able to see things like institutional, structural, and 
societal racism—and not be constrained to individual pathologies.36 
I am sympathetic to this criticism, and some of the earliest seminal writing 
in Critical Race Theory emphasized the deep limitations of a “perpetrator 
perspective” model of discrimination.37  Yet, this complaint commits an 
either/or fallacy.  The deepest understanding of any process such as 
racialization comes from multiple levels of analysis that can and should be 
integrated together.  Consider the various units of analysis one could use to 
explain something like “racism”: the neuron, brain, person, family, group, 
firm, institution, system, structure, culture, society, or history.38  When terms 
such as institutional, structural, or societal bias are well-defined and 
operationalized, there is no reason why they cannot be integrated with Implicit 
Social Cognition into the fullest understanding of how multiple causes, at 
multiple levels, contribute to social inequalities.  The fact that implicit biases 
may influence interpretation of ambiguous behavior, for instance, conflicts in 
no way with various economic and sociological models of inequality inertia.39  
To the contrary, they add an additional explanatory layer to the deepest 
understanding of persistent inequalities among social groups. 
As a concrete demonstration, consider again my simple model of racial 
mechanics.  In that social cognitive model, I pointed out that the racial 
categories, the racial mapping rules, and racial meanings are all socially 
constructed.  Although the science of Implicit Social Cognition is extremely 
 
 36. See, e.g., David Wellman, Unconscious Racism, Social Cognition Theory and the Legal 
Intent Doctrine: The Neuron Fires Next Time, in HANDBOOK OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC 
RELATIONS (Hernán Vera & Joe R. Feagin, eds.) (“[S]ociological understanding of unconscious 
racism avoids . . . conceptual pitfalls” and can “provide a far more potent critique of the intent 
doctrine than social cognition neuroscience.”). 
 37. See Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through 
Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 
1052–57 (1978). 
 38. See Richard M. Ryan & Edward L. Deci, Self-Regulation and the Problem of Human 
Autonomy: Does Psychology Need Choice, Self-Determination, and Will?, 74 J. PERSONALITY 
1557, 1571 (2006) (explaining that everything can be described from the “molecular to molar”).  
According to Ryan and Deci, the goal is to pick the best level of analysis, which “captures the 
variables most relevant to what is to be explained and that is most relevant for effective 
interventions.”  Id. at 1572. 
 39. See, e.g., GLENN C. LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY 23–30 (2002) 
(discussing self-reinforcing stereotypes); Michelle Adams, Intergroup Rivalry, Anti-Competitive 
Conduct and Affirmative Action, 82 B.U. L. REV. 1089, 1117–22 (2002) (applying lock-in theory 
to explain the inequalities between Blacks and Whites in education, housing, and employment); 
Daria Roithmayr, Barriers to Entry: A Market Lock-In Model of Discrimination, 86 VA. L. REV. 
727, 742–49 (2000) (providing overview of lock-in theory, drawing on antitrust law and 
concepts). 
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useful in providing compelling evidence that racial mechanics take place 
automatically, typically without self-awareness, that body of science tells us 
little about how and why the Census pulled out Pacific Islanders from the 
racial category of Asians.40  Social cognition tells us little about the political 
economy that drove adoption of the rule of hypodescent (one drop Black 
blood),41 a racial mapping rule that maximized “property” in the form of 
human slaves.  Social cognition tells us little about how the Federal 
Communications Commission came to define “public interest” for broadcasters 
in a way that had the unintended consequence of increasing negative racial 
attitudes.42  This is not to say that the social cognitive model explains nothing.  
It explains a great deal, and most importantly, provides the most potent 
response to the presumption that we are all already colorblind.  But this level 
of analysis cannot function alone, and it needs supporting analysis from above 
and even below.  What we need is interpenetration, across all the layers of 
knowledge. 
CONCLUSION 
In closing, I remind the Left (including myself) to avoid disciplinary 
parochialism, especially when it betrays a poor understanding of another 
discipline.43  Of course, there may be opportunity costs.  For example, 
behavioral realists might be distracting attention and resources from other 
methodologies, such as literature, cultural studies, sociology, history, and 
psychoanalysis.44  Whether there is a net benefit in insight can only be 
 
 40. Terrance Reeves & Claudette Bennett, U.S. Census Bureau, THE ASIAN AND PACIFIC 
ISLANDER POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES: MARCH 2002, available at http://www.census. 
gov/prod/2003pubs/p20-540.pdf. 
 41. See, e.g., Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution is Color-Blind,” 44 STAN. L. 
REV. 1, 23–27 (1991) (discussing rules of hypodescent). 
 42. See Kang, supra note 20, at 1545–53. 
 43. The sharpest disagreement I have with Wellman’s sociological analysis is his claim that 
“biases are fixed.”  See supra note 36.  To the contrary, implicit biases are quite malleable.  I also 
disagree with Wellman’s claim that a scientific model of bias destroys agency and thus moral or 
legal accountability.  It could, but it doesn’t have to. 
 44. See, e.g., Ralph Richard Banks & Richard Thompson Ford, (How) Does Unconscious 
Bias Matter?: Law, Politics, and Racial Inequality, 58 EMORY L.J. 1053, 1120–21 (2009) 
(making this criticism).  Banks and Ford’s critique may actually not come from the Left.  On the 
one hand, it seems to be from the Left because it suggests that nearly all of the implicit bias 
findings should be seen really as evidence of explicit or conscious biases that are simply 
concealed successfully.  See id. at 1065–68.  Indeed, talk of merely “implicit” biases is criticized 
as a sugar-coated palliative.  See id. at 1103–10.  On the other hand, their critique could be from 
the Right since it adopts the same “junk science” rhetoric, see id. at 1110–13, with the attendant 
list of politically correct “thought control” bogeymen, see id. at 1118 (fearing pharmacological 
cures that treat bigotry with a “rainbow-colored capsule available by prescription”); id. at 1119 
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answered after the fact.  One way to gauge the worth of the investment is to see 
how much more the science (as compared to other forms of progressive 
discourse) upsets the Right. 
This symposium is dedicated to the remarkable life work of john powell.  
Part of the specialness of his mind and work comes from a willingness to 
interpenetrate the layers of knowledge, across methodologies and levels of 
abstraction.  He is best known for his work on institutions and structures, but 
he is no foe to the recent findings in implicit bias.  Instead, he vigorously seeks 
synthesis, synergy, and full understanding, which is always helpful in doing 
the right thing. 
  
 
(comparing implicit bias approach to re-education camps and “polic[ing of] thoughts”).  Maybe 
they’re so Left that they came out on the Right. 
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